The Concept of Middle Powers and Its Relevance to Vietnam

The contemporary international political arena is expanding its framework, allowing other actors to participate and voice their positions to a certain extent, including middle powers. The recent practices regarding the roles and behaviors of these states have attracted scholarly attention. This article outlines the general characteristics of middle power behavior, and from there, draws connections and suggests research implications for Vietnam.

1. Concept

The concept of a “middle power” did not emerge only in contemporary politics; it was first proposed in the 15th century. Giovanni Botero, Mayor of Milan (Italy), defined a middle power as an entity possessing sufficient strength and authority to make autonomous decisions (1). Following Botero, the concept has been further studied, refined, and developed.

From a realist perspective, scholars argue that the notion of middle powers is relational, as it is often defined in comparison with other tiers within the system, particularly with major powers. To identify middle powers, scholars Ralf Emmers and Sarah Teo proposed a framework based on seven datasets: GDP, GDP per capita, land area, population, military expenditure, Human Development Index (HDI), and participation in international organizations (2). Although not on par in power with great powers, middle powers can be considered “second-tier” powers, possessing the capacity to influence the international system through active engagement in global governance processes. For example, 11 of the 20 G20 countries are regarded as typical middle powers.

Meanwhile, the liberal school identifies middle powers through their distinctive diplomatic behavior. Middle powers often cannot act effectively alone but can exert influence within a group of countries or through international institutions (3). Prioritizing multilateral solutions, emphasizing dialogue and peaceful measures in international disputes, and supporting the normative positions of the international community are characteristic of a middle power (4). Unlike the power-based approach, which emphasizes material capabilities, the behavioral approach highlights norms, ethics, and responsibility of states within the international system.

The constructivist school defines middle powers by examining a state’s values and identity. Accordingly, a country’s image (reflected in its foreign policy) and its recognition by other actors help shape its status as a middle power. Such countries may lack sufficient power to rank alongside major powers but do not want to be lumped together with the rest, thus seeking distinctive or substitute roles to demonstrate leadership capacity (5). Middle powers are thus characterized by four main identities: proposing initiatives, acting as a bridge, coordinating alliances, and promoting norms (6).

Marxist theory views international relations as a continuous struggle and revolution to resolve contradictions between the ruling and the ruled, in which forces seek to maximize their power to achieve advantageous positions in the international system (7). Neo-Marxists argue that countries, including middle powers, should be positioned relative to other states in the world political-economic system. Within a system comprising core, semi-periphery, and periphery states, middle powers, with stronger economies than small states, can be placed from the core to the semi-periphery. Furthermore, due to the law of uneven development, middle powers are divided into two groups: traditional middle powers, with developed economies located in the core, and emerging middle powers, with developing economies in the semi-periphery. Additionally, considering each group’s interest in regional sub-systems, emerging middle powers are seen as dedicating more resources to implementing regional policies (8).

Overall, these theories illuminate and explain different aspects of the middle power concept. In general, middle powers are states with power and influence greater than the rest of the system but below that of superpowers; they exhibit distinctive behavior and identity, primarily seeking national interests through multilateralism and international norms.

During the Cold War, the concept of middle powers was often associated with countries such as Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway. However, the diffusion of power and the economic and political rise of several Asian and Latin American countries have necessitated distinguishing between traditional and emerging middle powers. This need reflects the changing structure of the international system with the emergence of non-Western actors (9).

Traditional Middle Powers

In terms of power, these countries are all developed economies (members of the OECD) with high average incomes, typically including Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway. After World War II, these countries actively participated in building international institutions and made significant contributions to peacekeeping activities. A key characteristic of traditional middle powers is that they follow the lead of system-driving countries (10). Many countries in this group are part of military alliances with superpowers (such as NATO or ANZUS).

Emerging Middle Powers

These countries attained middle-power status after the Cold War due to rapid economic growth and proactive engagement in the international community (11). Most of these countries have larger populations than the traditional middle powers, developing economies, and average income levels. Their positions are relatively high within regional sub-systems (12), examples being Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Turkey, and South Korea (with potential to join the traditional group). Comparatively, the emerging southern countries are catching up fairly quickly with the traditional group.

2. Common Behaviors of Middle Powers

The common strategies of middle powers can be divided into two types: functional and behavioral.

According to the “functional” strategy, middle powers concentrate their resources on a specific area of “specialized diplomacy” in which they have capabilities (13). This stems from their limited capacity, which prevents them from deploying comprehensive power like major powers. Many middle powers have built reputations in certain fields, such as South Korea and South Africa in nuclear issues; Canada and Australia in peacekeeping; Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway in human security. These issues are generally compatible with, or at least do not threaten, the vital interests of major powers (14).

Meanwhile, the “behavioral” strategy helps middle powers protect their interests through norms and intersubjective standards of state behavior in the international system (15). Not all middle powers have built a specialized diplomatic brand, so the behavioral strategy seems more widespread. This strategy is based on the concepts of internationalism and activism (16). Middle powers particularly value the role of multilateral institutions, international law, and diplomatic networks in their foreign policy (17). These aspects form the foundation for building a healthy international order aligned with their national interests.

Middle powers implement these policies for several reasons. First, multilateralism. Unlike first-tier powers, which act unilaterally when possible and multilaterally when necessary, middle powers are less capable of effective unilateral action, especially in areas dominated by major powers. Even though major powers may design and impose the rules of the game in certain cases, multilateral mechanisms remain open and transparent forums aimed at ensuring equality among actors. This allows middle powers to participate more deeply in global governance, playing distinctive roles such as coordinator, catalyst, and initiative proposer.

Second, international law is also a key instrument in middle powers’ policies. The more rules-based the order, the less it is dominated by powerful states. As countries enhance their status and prosperity, they seek a rules-based system to protect their interests. For middle powers, a healthy world order with predictable, law-based structures enables them to survive and develop (18). Moreover, such a framework provides legitimacy for their participation in international and regional affairs. In the context of increasing major-power competition, middle powers actively and proactively seek to shift their role from rule enforcer to rule maker. A new, democratic, rules-based order led by middle powers is an appealing concept, although difficult to achieve due to their limited power (19).

Third, middle powers emphasize strengthening and expanding diplomatic networks. A broad network helps these states become central players and gain influence in shaping the global agenda. Two main focuses are maintaining partnerships with all centers of power and building informal alliances or comprehensive/strategic partnership frameworks with like-minded states. Instead of pursuing opportunistic or zero-sum policies, middle powers often adopt hedging strategies (20) or dynamic balancing depending on the issue and timing, without aligning fully with one side against another (21).

Middle powers not only focus on relations with major powers but also develop “horizontal cooperation.” Building informal alliances and/or partnership frameworks is a behavioral characteristic of middle powers (22). Cooperation with like-minded middle powers is valued, allowing them to leverage collective strength in global governance while serving as a bridge or mediator between large and small states.

3. Academic Implications for Vietnam

Whether Vietnam qualifies as a middle power remains debated in academic circles (23). Some studies, however, consider Vietnam as a middle power (24). The 2018 and 2019 Asia Power Index by the Lowy Institute (Australia) ranked Vietnam in the middle-power category (25).

As an emerging middle power, Vietnam increasingly appears in international and domestic scholarly research. At the 2013 ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, Vietnam was assessed as an emerging middle power (26). Barbara Kratiuk (2014) argued that Vietnam should be considered a middle power, having met capacity criteria and demonstrated political will to participate actively in regional and international affairs (27). Similarly, Raft Emmers and Sarah Teo (2014) selected Vietnam as one of four case studies of middle powers in the Asia-Pacific, noting that Vietnam (along with Indonesia) met four middle-power criteria while only satisfying three criteria for small states (28). From the perspective of self-constructed national branding, Leif Eric Easley (2012) observed that Vietnam was already developing middle-power national identities, reflected in interactions within global governance and East Asian regionalism (29). Other studies also emphasize Vietnam’s role; for example, in the article “How the World Order Ends and What Comes Next,” Richard Haass, President of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, referred to Vietnam as a regional power alongside India and Japan (30). Vietnam’s increasing participation in UN peacekeeping and its intermediary role in the U.S.–North Korea summit have further heightened attention to this concept. Domestic scholars have begun to explore this concept in depth as well (31).

A particularly important aspect in building a middle-power brand is the research channel. Studying middle powers not only clarifies theoretical foundations but also has practical significance. In diplomacy, scholars act as track II actors, proposing ideas and policy recommendations to decision-makers (32). Track II engagement, if widely communicated, can clarify Vietnam’s behaviors and diplomatic conduct in a new framework, consistent with its increasing position and capabilities. It can also serve as a “barometer” for policymakers to decide whether to adopt the concept officially (33). For instance, Australian prime ministers have promoted “innovative middle-power diplomacy (34),” and South Korea, though cautious about directly using the term, has reflected many middle-power traits in its foreign policy (35) - from a catalytic, central role (through Northeast Asia initiatives under Roh Moo-hyun) to organizing, mediating, and agenda-setting (through Global Korea under Lee Myung-bak and Moon Jae-in’s New Southern Policy). From these examples, it is clear that with suitable capacity and behavior, Vietnam can confidently pursue more ambitious objectives. Modesty is necessary, but in certain areas and situations, precise national positioning allows for more appropriate decision-making aligned with current realities (36).

In terms of both capacity and behavior, middle powers are a distinct research category compared with great powers and small states. Capacity-wise, they fall between the top and bottom of the power scale. Behavior-wise, they do not compete with superpowers but also refuse to play the victim in great-power politics. Middle powers adopt foreign policies that are both proactive and cautious to maximize national interests, focusing on strengthening and expanding multilateral diplomacy, international norms, and extensive diplomatic networks.

For Vietnam, having met several fundamental criteria in both capacity and behavior, an increasing number of studies regard it as a middle power. Its continued pursuit of an independent, self-reliant, peaceful, cooperative, and development-oriented foreign policy - emphasizing multilateralism, diversification, strategic convergence, adherence to international law - demonstrates characteristics consistent with an emerging middle power.

(1) Dong-min Shin: “A Critical Review of the Concept of Middle Power,” E-International Relations 4, 2015.

(2) Ralf Emmers and Sarah Teo: Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia Pacific, Melbourne Univ. Publishing, Melbourne, 2018, p.112.

(3) Robert O. Keohane: “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International Organization 23, no. 2, 1969, p.298.

(4) Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal: Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993, p.19.

(5) Robert W. Cox: Approaches to World Order, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.245.

(6) Sook-Jong Lee et al.: “Middle Power in Action: The Evolving Nature of Diplomacy in the Age of Multilateralism,” East Asia Institute, Korea, 2015, p.5.

(7) See also V.I. Lenin: Complete Works, vol.26, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2005.

(8) Marxism-Leninism views international relations as systemic—subsystemic. See also Eduard Jordaan: “The concept of a middle power in international relations: distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers,” Politikon 30, no.1, 2003, p.168.

(9) Tanguy Struye de Swielande et al.: Rethinking Middle Powers in the Asian Century: New Theories, New Cases, Routledge, 2018, p.40.

(10) Andrew Fenton Cooper and Emel Parlar Dal: “Positioning the Third Wave of Middle Power Diplomacy: Institutional Elevation, Practice Limitations,” International Journal 71, no.4, 2016, p.520.

(11) See also Yolanda Kemp Spies: “Structural Diplomacy: Development, Participation and Governance,” in Global South Perspectives on Diplomacy, 2019, p.209.

(12) Jordaan: “The concept of a middle power in international relations,” p.169.

(13) Andrew Fenton Cooper, Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1997), p.10; Alan K. Henrikson, “Niche diplomacy in the world public arena: The global ‘corners’ of Canada and Norway,” in The New Public Diplomacy (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005), p.67.

(14) Lê Đình Tĩnh: “Middle Power Objectives and the Prospects of Vietnam’s Diplomacy after 2030,” p.34.

(15) Emmers and Teo: Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia Pacific, p.152.

(16) Kim Nossal and Richard Stubbs: “Mahathir’s Malaysia: An Emerging Middle Power?” in Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1997, p.150.

(17) Carl Ungerer and Simon Smith: Australia and South Korea: Middle Power Cooperation and Asian Security (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2010), p.4; R. Emmers and S. Teo: “Regional Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 15 (24-4-2014): 192. 

(18) Thomas Wright, “Middle Powers and the Multilateral Pivot,” in MIKTA, Middle Powers, and New Dynamics of Global Governance: The G20’s Evolving Agenda, ed. Mo Jongryn, Asan-Palgrave Macmillan Series, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2015, p.20. 

(19) Richard Haass: “How a World Order Ends and What Comes in Its Wake,” Foreign Affairs 98, no.1, 2019, p.30.

(20) Thi Bich Tran and Yoichiro Sato: “Vietnam’s Post-Cold War Hedging Strategy: A Changing Mix of Realist and Liberal Ingredients,” Asian Politics & Policy 10, no.1, 2018, pp.81–82. 

(21) Vũ Lê Thái Hoàng and Lê Linh Lan: “The Role of Multilateral Diplomacy in Middle Power Foreign Policy: The Case of Indonesia,” Journal of International Studies, no.2, 2015, p.125.

(22) Richard Higgott and Andrew Cooper: “Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations,” International Organization 44, 1990, p.589. 

(23) This article primarily studies behavioral aspects, not capacity.

(24) Leif-Eric Easley: “Middle Power National Identity? South Korea and Vietnam in US-China Geopolitics,” Pacific Focus 27, no.3, 2012, pp.421–42, https://doi.org

Emmers and Teo: “Regional Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific.”

(25) Lowy Institute: “Asia Power Index,” 2019, https://power.lowyinstitute.org. 

The 2019 ranking assessed Vietnam and New Zealand as the two middle powers with the most significant improvement compared to other countries.

(26) Sharon Chen and Gopal Ratnam: “Vietnam Rises as Middle Power at Defense Summit: Southeast Asia,” https://www.bloomberg.com. 

(27) Barbara Kratiuk: “Vietnam as a Middle Power in Southeast Asia” (Second International Conference on Asian Studies: ICAS 2014, Sri Lanka, 2014). 

(28) Emmers and Teo: “Regional Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific,” p.190.

(29) Easley: “Middle Power National Identity?” p.422.

(30) Haass: “How a World Order Ends and What Comes in Its Wake,” p.30. 

(31) Some studies have also been cited in this article. 

(32) Sheldon W. Simon: “Evaluating Track II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: The CSCAP Experience,” The Pacific Review 15, no.2, 2002, p.167. 

(33) The term “middle power” can be sensitive; therefore, it may be used flexibly with middle or intermediate countries. See also Dinh Tinh Le: “Vietnam as an Emerging Middle Power Towards 2030 and Beyond,” The Russian Journal of Vietnamese Studies 2, no.3, 2019, p.9. 

(34) Kevin M. Rudd: “Address to the East Asia Forum in conjunction with the Australian National University, Advancing Australia’s Global and Regional Economic Interests,” PM Transcripts: Transcripts by the Prime Ministers of Australia 26 (2008); Tony Abbott: “Press Conference, Houston,” 2014, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au; Malcolm Turnbull: “Interview with Haidi Lun, Bloomberg,” 2017, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au. 

(35) Brendan Howe and Min Park: “South Korea’s (Incomplete) Middle-Power Diplomacy Toward ASEAN,” International Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 15, no.2, 2019, p.123. 

(36) Lê Đình Tĩnh: “The World with Major Changes and Vietnam’s Responses,” Journal of Party Building, 2020, http://www.xaydungdang.org.vn. 

(Source: https://vietnamhoinhap.vn/article/khai-niem-cuong-quoc-tam-trung-va-lien-he-voi-viet-nam---n-33048)